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Paul R. Krugman 
In  the  three  years  since the Plaza  Accord  the  central  bankers  and finance 
ministers of the large industrial nations have come to a consensus in favor of 
exchange rate management. For better or for worse, it is now taken as a matter 
of  course that the G-5 countries will at any given time form a collective view 
about the appropriate levels of nominal exchange rates, and make at least some 
effort  to  stabilize  actual  rates  in  the  vicinity  of  those  appropriate  rates. 
Admittedly, what we have at the moment are “soft, quiet” rather than “loud, 
hard” target zones-that  is, the zones are not publicly announced, nor is there 
great determination to defend them in the face of strong market pressures. That 
means that the zones are still a long way from a restoration of  fixed rates. Yet 
in a muted form the de facto target-zone regime of the late 1980s does pose 
many  of  the  traditional  difficulties  of  any  regime  in  which  governments 
actively attempt to set the exchange rate. 
The  most  basic  of  these  difficulties  is  that  of  objective:  what  are the 
appropriate target exchange rates? At the time of  the Plaza Accord, there was 
general  agreement  that the dollar needed  to go lower (although  only a few 
months before the U.S. administration had been claiming the strong dollar as 
a sign of successful economic policies). The question since has been where to 
stop.  In a  long-established  fixed  rate system, historical  parities  provide  a 
natural  focal  point  for policy  coordination, and the problem of  assessing 
equilibrium rates arises only when parity adjustment forces itself on reluctant 
policymakers.  In  the  present  situation,  however,  the  effort  to  stabilize 
exchange rates requires making a judgement about appropriate levels more or 
less from scratch. 
Paul R. Krugman is professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and 
a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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The purpose  of  this  paper  is to  discuss the  issues raised  in  an  effort to 
determine equilibrium exchange rates  that  may  be  appropriate  targets  for 
coordinated policies. I do not here attempt to address the question of whether 
it makes sense to have exchange rate targets at all, which would bring a number 
of  additional issues into the picture; of course to the extent that equilibrium 
rates are found to be either hard to assess or unstable, this helps load the scales 
against trying to fix rates.  The main focus, however, is on the hypothetical 
situation of  a group of  policymakers, such as the (3-5 ministers, who have 
decided for better or worse to try to stabilize currencies around some agreed 
central  rates. What  considerations  should  enter into their  choice of central 
rates? What problems of assessment should they be concerned about, and what 
methods are most likely to give reasonable answers‘? 
The paper is in four parts. The first addresses the broad conceptual issue of 
what is meant by an equilibrium rate, and the reasons why target rates might 
differ from the current market rates on the eve of  monetary  agreement. The 
second part examines the extent to which equilibrium rates may be expected 
to show long-run trends; this issue is important both because an exchange rate 
regime  needs  somehow  to  accommodate such trends  and  because  secular 
trends in equilibrium rates complicate the problem of guessing at the right rates 
during a transition to greater exchange rate stability. The third part examines 
the role of  exchange rates  in the process  of  narrowing  international  current 
account  balances, reviewing  and  (I hope) settling  some disputes  that  have 
arisen over the respective roles of fiscal and exchange rate adjustment in this 
process. The final part of  the paper addresses the practical  issues of assess- 
ment: how do we make a good guess at equilibrium exchange rates, and where 
might we go wrong? 
4.1  The Meaning of Equilibrium Exchange Rates 
The idea that one ought to attempt to calculate an equilibrium real exchange 
rate-with  the implicit view that  this rate may  be different  from the actual 
current  rate-is  itself  controversial. In  the  years  prior to  the  Plaza,  then- 
Undersecretary  Beryl  Sprinkel repeatedly  asserted that  the  equilibrium  ex- 
change rate is whatever the actual market rate is at this moment. His statement 
was  of  course true  in  the sense that  the  exchange market  is  pretty  much 
continuously clearing. What advocates of some deliberate policy toward the 
exchange rate believe is not that there is literal disequilibrium  in the market, 
but something more complex. 
Briefly put, when we talk of the “equilibrium exchange rate” as something 
different from the current rate, we usually  mean two things. First is that the 
equilibrium real exchange rate at some time in the future will be foreseeably 
different  from today’s  real  exchange rate. Second is that  policy toward  the 
nominal  exchange rate  can  somehow facilitate  the  adjustment  toward  this 
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calculate equilibrium real exchange rates as a basis for policy breaks into two 
subquestions:  are there predictable  and analyzable  sources of real exchange 
rate shifts, and can nominal exchange rate policy facilitate such shifts? 
4.1.1 
Real Shocks 
Sources of  Shifts in the Equilibrium  Real Exchange Rate 
There is universal agreement on the principle that real events can change 
equilibrium  real exchange rates, which are after all relative prices like any 
others. The sources of dispute are how large and how frequent such shocks are. 
One possible  source of  shifts in  equilibrium  real  exchange rates  is the 
presence of secular trends due to differences in rates of technological change, 
differences in product mix, and so on. The potential presence of secular trends 
in  the  real  exchange rate  is of  crucial importance  and  is  given  separate 
treatment below. 
Aside  from  such  long-run  trends,  the  major  source of  real  shocks to 
equilibrium exchange rates seems likely to be commodity-price shocks. For the 
G-5 countries, which are all primarily exporters of manufactures, such shocks 
cannot  have  the  same importance that  they  do for  primary  exporters,  but 
differences in resource position may mean that equilibrium rates are affected 
significantly  nonetheless.  In  particular,  a  fall  in  the  price  of  oil  should 
presumably lower the equilibrium real exchange rate of self-sufficient Britain, 
while raising that of  import-dependent Japan. 
Capital Flows 
A more controversial source of shifts in equilibrium real exchange rates is 
shifts in international capital flows. 
Suppose that  for  some reason  a  country  is  the  temporary  recipient  of 
substantial  capital  inflows.  This might  be because of  an  investment  boom 
generated by technological change or resource discoveries, because of changes 
in tax laws, or because of a bulge in government deficits. Whatever the source, 
the  capital  inflows  will  normally  be  spent  domestically  to some important 
extent, raising the demand for nontraded goods produced domestically and also 
(perhaps) raising the relative price of  a country’s goods on world markets. To 
the extent that  the capital flows are predictably  temporary,  there  will  be  a 
prospective decline in the equilibrium real exchange rate. The relevance of this 
example to the U.S. case is of course obvious. 
Why is this controversial? There are serious problems in deciding which 
capital flows are transitory and likely to trail off in the near future, and which 
are going to be long-term features of the landscape. For example, is Japan’s 
current account surplus a temporary bulge, to be followed by a return to the 
much more modest surpluses of the pre-1980 period, or is Japan going to be 
a  twentieth-century  equivalent  of  nineteenth-century  Britain,  consistently 
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case can be made for either view. Also, economists can legitimately disagree 
about the substitutability of traded goods produced in different countries, and 
about  the  substitution  between  traded  and  nontraded  goods  within  each 
country, leading to  uncertainty about how large a real exchange rate change 
is needed to accommodate a given capital flow. 
In  addition to  these  legitimate  controversies, however,  there  is also con- 
siderable sheer confusion about the relationship between real exchange rates 
and capital flows, the result of a failure by many economists to understand the 
meaning of the saving-investment identity. Like the long-run trend in exchange 
rates, this is a topic that requires further discussion and is given a section of 
its own. 
Nominal Shocks 
Most policymakers  and many economists believe that real exchange rates 
can be temporarily  pushed  away from their  long-run  equilibrium  values by 
nominal  shocks,  such as changes  in  monetary  policy  or,  for that  matter, 
pegging of  nominal  exchange rates  at levels that  imply disequilibrium  real 
exchange rates at current price levels. Perhaps the most famous example in 
theory is the Dornbusch (1976) model, in which a monetary expansion leads 
temporarily to a large nominal depreciation that both exceeds and precedes the 
subsequent price increase. During the adjustment  implied by the Dornbusch 
model, we would see a depreciation and then a subsequent appreciation of the 
real exchange rate. 
The view  that nominal  shocks produce  temporary  disequilibrium  real ex- 
change rates depends on the belief that nominal prices are at least somewhat 
sticky in terms of domestic currency (more on this below). Aside from direct 
testing of  this proposition, however, there is also the question of whether such 
nominal sources of  real exchange rate movements are important in practice. 
An implication of nominal stickiness models of real exchange rate fluctuations 
is that such fluctuations should be temporary; the Dornbusch model, for ex- 
ample, is often  taken  to  imply  that  the real  exchange rate  should  follow a 
first-order autoregressive process. Yet a number of studies have been unable 
to reject the hypothesis that in the floating rate period real exchange rates have 
followed a random walk. This result is often taken as evidence that whatever 
the possible role of nominal shocks, in practice real exchange rate movements 
must represent primarily more-or-less permanent real shocks. 
While appealing, this argument is wrong. In fact, the failure to find clear 
evidence  of  autoregression  of real rates  in the floating rate period does not 
demonstrate that nominal shocks are unimportant as sources of real exchange 
rate  fluctuations.  Instead,  it  should  be  viewed  as  a  demonstration  of  the 
difficulty of  discovering evidence of structural characteristics of  the economy 
using  theory-free  time series  methods. Quite strong autoregression  in eco- 
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random  walk  without many years of  data; and the evidence is beginning  to 
show that this is precisely what has happened with data on the real exchange 
rate. 
A  full-fledged  treatment  of  this  issue  has  been  produced  recently  by 
Huizinga (1987). It may be useful, however, to have a semiformal treatment 
that makes the point to those (like myself) who are less than fully versed in 
the time series methods. (This exposition closely follows Frankel  1989.) 
Consider, then, a situation in which the real exchange rate, measured as a 
deviation from its long-run equilibrium level, follows a process 
(1) 
where e  is  an  i.i.d.  random  variable  with  variance  s2.  We  may  pose  the 
“random walk” question as follows: how much data would we need to reject 
the hypothesis b  = l? 
A crude approach to this would be to simply estimate b using ordinary least 
squares, and apply a t-test. It is by now familiar that this is not quite right, since 
under the null hypothesis that b  = 0 the assumption of boundedness  for the 
right-hand-side  variable  is not  valid. Even though  this is not the right test, 
however, it is illuminating (at least to me) to see what we can expect by way 
of standard errors on b when the true value is something less than one. 
In a regression with only one independent variable, the true variance of  the 
estimate of  b is 
x, = bx,  ~  , + e,,  0 < b < 1, 
varjb) = s2/[N  var(x)], 
where N is the number of observations. In turn, the variance of x  generated by 
the process described is s2/(  1 - b’).  Thus it turns out that the variance of  the 
estimate is independent of the volatility of the shocks generating exchange rate 
fluctuations; it is simply equal to 
(1 -  b2)/N. 
Now consider what  a fairly high degree of  price  stickiness  might  imply. 
Suppose that we are working with annual data and that b  = 0.8-that  is, the 
“half-life”  of  a  nominal  shock  is  five years.  This is not  an  unreasonable 
number if one tries substituting typical estimates of  the slope of  the Phillips 
curve into an IS-LM model. Then the variance of the estimate of b will be 
0.36lN. 
In  order to  put  the  true  b  two standard  deviations away  from  one, the 
variance of the estimate will need to be reduced to (0.1)2  = 0.01. This will 
require thirty-six years of data! Thus it should be no surprise that the floating 
rate period  has not  yielded  enough evidence to reject  the hypothesis  of  no 
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Nor  are very  long  time  series  necessarily  the  answer (although Jeffrey 
Frankel has found that with a very long time series on the real dollar-pound 
rate, strong mean reversion  can in fact be confirmed; see Frankel  1989). In 
long series, any drift in the real exchange rate over time will be correlated 
with the lagged rate, and a regression of  the form of equation (1) will end up 
largely telling us this; in effect, by omitting variables representing  structural 
change, one will end up biasing the results in such a way as to miss the mean 
reversion. 
It is somewhat ironic that, given the way the failure to reject a random walk 
has been used in doctrinal debate, a random walk will be harder to reject the 
stickier are prices,  and hence the more slowly the real exchange rate rcverts 
to its long-run equilibrium. In a way,  therefore, it is arguable that the high 
degree of persistence in real exchange rates found since 1973  is in fact evidence 
that fairly inflexible prices are the rule, and that therefore nominal shocks in 
fact have very large effects on real exchange rates. 
This brings  us, however,  to the  question  of  price  behavior.  Sometimes 
debates over exchange rate theory and policy are seen as simply another round 
in  the  eternal  struggle  between  equilibrium  and  sticky  price  theories  of 
macroeconomics.  This is not entirely right; some of the crucial issues are not 
contingent  solely  on one’s  view  about  how  prices  behave.  However,  the 
question of  whether  nominal  rate changes help facilitate real exchange rate 
changes is crucial to the subject of  this paper and needs some discussion. 
4.1.2  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates 
Most economists would now agree that in the long run the real exchange rate 
is a real phenomenon, not affected by nominal currency parities. How one gets 
to the long run, however, may depend very much on nominal parities.  If one 
pegs the nominal exchange rate at a level that, given current price levels, does 
not produce the long-run real exchange rate, then that long-run rate must be 
established through some combination of inflation in the undervalued countries 
and deflation  in the overvalued. 
How costly is this process? Even if one believed in high flexibility of prices, 
one might  prefer to adjust the exchange rate in order to preserve  a greater 
degree of domestic price stability; this was essentially the position of Friedman 
(1953)  in his classic defense of  floating rates. However, the willingness  of 
governments to defend nominal panties depends critically on their view about 
how much price rigidity there is in domestic currency. If prices were perfectly 
flexible, of course, wages and prices would move continuously  and instantly 
to clear markets. Even if prices were not totally flexible, however, one could 
imagine a world in which residents of each country regarded themselves as part 
of  a world economy, where national  boundaries  made little difference, and 
where workers and firms therefore tried to set prices and wages in a way that 
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ized”  economies  like  that  of  Israel  a  few years  back).  In  such  a  world, 
exchange rates would have little real significance, since a nominal exchange 
rate change would simply have the effect of producing some combination of 
inflation in the depreciating country and deflation in the appreciating country. 
The neutrality  of nominal exchange rates is a key  theme of  “global  mone- 
tarists”  such as McKinnon (1984), McKinnon and Ohno (1986), and Mundell 
(1  987), sometimes expressed in the slogan that the exchange rate is the relative 
price of two moneys, not the relative price of two goods or two kinds of labor. 
In fact, however, the experience of floating rates in the 1980s-a  period of 
relatively low inflation differentials among the major industrial countries-has 
given very clear evidence in favor of the view that prices are substantially rigid 
in  domestic currency.  Consider  figures 4.1 and 4.2,  which  show the  U.S. 
nominal exchange rate (actually an average index against other OECD coun- 
tries) versus an index of U.S. relative unit labor costs (using the same weights) 
and an index of the price of U.S. exports compared with the export prices of 
the rest of the OECD. It turns out that the nominal exchange rate has very nearly 
been the relative price of  two kinds of labor, and of two goods as well. 
Why is this true? Without taking a long detour into the new microfound- 
ations of Keynesian economics, we may state the basic point briefly. Whether 
because of menu costs or bounded rationality,  firms do not constantly change 
their prices and wage offers in response to changes in demand, nor do they 
index their prices optimally. Instead, they fix prices in nominal terms for fairly 
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Fig. 4.2  Nominal vs. real exchange rate 
long periods-and  the overlapping pricing  decisions  of thousands of  price- 
setters create substantial inertia in the overall level of wages and prices. 
The important addendum for international economics is that when prices are 
set in nominal terms, they are set in terms of domestic currency. In principle, 
this needn't happen.  Prices in the Federal Republic of Germany could be set 
in dollars, or prices in Italy in ecu; the medium of exchange and the unit of 
account functions of money can be, and sometimes are, separated. In advanced 
countries, however, prices are sufficiently predictable that there is no need to 
turn  to a  foreign currency  for  a  usable  standard,  unlike  the  situation  in 
hyperinflation countries. And the fact is that domestic currency  has a much 
more predictable  purchasing  power for residents of every advanced  country 
than any foreign currency. 
The  only major objection to  this evidence  that makes any sense is the argument 
that the causation is actually running the other way-that  what really happens 
is that real exchange  rates are moving around for real reasons, and that the attempt 
of monetary authorities to stabilize domestic price levels creates the correlation 
between real and nominal rates. This view is often buttressed by an appeal to the 
apparent random-walk character of real exchange rates, which is taken as ev- 
idence that real rather than nominal shocks dominate exchange  rate movements. 
We  have seen, however,  that  the evidence against mean reversion  in real 
exchange rates is not well founded and may  indeed be used as evidence of 
more, not less, price rigidity.  There is also a question of plausibility.  What 
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15 percent from the first half of  1984 to the first half of  1985, then drove it 
down by 20 percent over the following year? 
There is  also a further piece  of  evidence  of  the  importance of  nominal 
exchange  rates.  This  is  the  way  that  changes  in  the  exchange regime  are 
strikingly reflected in changes in the behavior of real exchange rates. Suppose 
that one believed that real exchange  rates were a real phenomenon, not affected 
by nominal rates. Then there would be no particular reason why a change in 
the exchange rate regime should alter the behavior of real exchange rates. In 
particular, one would expect real exchange rates to be no more variable under 
floating rates than under fixed. 
Figure 4.3, which is borrowed from Rudiger Dornbusch and Albert0 Giovan- 
nini, shows monthly changes in the real exchange rate (using wholesale prices as 
deflators) between the U.S. and Germany from 1960 to 1986. That is, the first 
half of this figure shows the experience under fixed rates, the second half under 
floating rates. The variance of  monthly changes in this real exchange rate was 
fifteen times as large in the second half of the sample as in the first. 
In sum, then, there is at this point overwhelming  evidence  that nominal 
exchange rate changes do in the short run produce real exchange rate changes, 
and that the effects on the real exchange  rate are quite persistent. The implication 
of this for the discussion of exchange rate policy is clear. First, if policymakers 
know  where the equilibrium real exchange rate is headed, they can greatly 
facilitate adjustment by  allowing or inducing nominal rates to move in  that 
direction. Second, getting nominal rates wrong can be very costly because it 
may take a long time for the equilibrium real rates to get themselves established. 
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4.2  Long-run Trends in Equilibrium Real Exchange Rates 
Even though the evidence is now pretty clear that there is a strong element 
of  mean reversion in real exchange rate behavior,  long-run secular trends in 
equilibrium real rates still pose crucial problems for exchange rate stabiliza- 
tion. These problems are of two kinds. First, even a functioning system can 
be ripped apart if the secular trends run too quickly. Suppose, for example, that 
we could correctly estimate the sustainable dollar-yen rate at the present instant 
to be  130, and that we are prepared to adjust the central parity in line with 
relative inflation. We  will still find ourselves in trouble if  there is a secular 
appreciation of the equilibrium real yen that raises the equilibrium yen, even 
after correcting for differential inflation, to ninety within five years. Arguably 
it was the secular decline in the equilibrium real dollar that really broke up 
Bretton Woods: the overvaluation of the dollar in 1971 owed little to a faster 
U.S. inflation  rate  since  1960, and  much  to  a  decline  in  the  real  dollar 
compatible with international equilibrium. 
Even more important than the question of drift in the future equilibrium rate 
is the problem of getting the rates right to start with. By any historical standard, 
the real yen looks extremely high right now. Yet Japan continues to run huge 
current account surpluses. What most econometric evidence suggests is that 
the explanation lies in a rapid secular upward trend in the equilibrium real yen. 
If correct, this interpretation tells us that the pace of secular change has been 
rapid enough to make the usual indicators of competitiveness useless over only 
an eight-year period. 
It is important, then, to get at the determinants of  long-run trends in equi- 
librium real exchange rates and to have some idea of their likely future path. 
Broadly  speaking, there  are two major theories  of  secular  trends  in real 
exchange rates.  First  is  the theory  associated  with  Balassa  (1964), which 
attributes  such  trends  to  differential  productivity  growth  in  tradable  and 
nontradable  sectors.  Second  is  the  alternative, more  Keynesian  approach 
associated  with Johnson (1958) and Houthakker  and Magee (1969), which 
puts the stress on growth rates and income elasticities.  We  consider each in 
turn. 
4.2.1  Tradables versus Nontradables 
Suppose that Japanese and American workers are equally productive in the 
manufacturing sector, but that the Japanese workers are only half as productive 
in  the  service  sector.  Since manufactured  goods  are generally traded  and 
services generally nontraded, we would expect, other things being equal, to 
see rough  equality  between  Japanese and U.S.  wage rates, that  is, to see 
relative wages determined by relative productivity in the traded goods sector. 
This will mean that services will be twice as expensive in Japan, and that a 
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apparently overvalued yen. More to the point, if Japanese productivity growth 
continues to be concentrated  in manufacturing  to a greater extent than is the 
case for the United States, there will be a secular drift in the equilibrium real 
exchange rate if services are included in the deflators. 
This is the essence of the differential productivity  argument  for trends in 
equilibrium real exchange rates. It was introduced by Kravis and Balassa both 
to explain trends in real exchange rates and to explain absolute differences in 
the cost of living across countries at a point in time. Marston (1987) has shown 
that interpretation of movements in the real exchange rate between the United 
States and Japan in  the  1973-83  period  must  be  heavily  qualified by  this 
Kravis-Balassa effect  because  Japanese productivity  growth  was so heavily 
concentrated  in traded goods industries. 
While  the  tradable-nontradable  approach  to  trends  in  equilibrium real 
exchange rates  identifies  an important reason  for secular trends, it is not  a 
complete story. The reason is that changes in the relative price of tradables and 
nontradables would be the only source of  real exchange rate changes only if 
PPP held over time for traded goods. As we have seen, however, in figure 4.2, 
there are large short-run swings in the relative  prices  even of  exportables. 
Admittedly, it is possible to conceive of models in which large deviations from 
PPP for traded goods occur in the short run yet the law of one price for tradables 
holds in the long run; indeed, we will describe such a model below. Yet this 
need not be the case if countries in fact produce different mixes of goods. In 
practice there are several cases in which  PPP for traded goods seems to be 
clearly  violated  in  the  long  run.  The United  States  has appeared  to need 
significantly lower relative export prices in the late 1970s and 1980s in order 
to balance its trade than it needed in the late 1960s. Japan, on the other side, 
has a very  strong currency by  historical  standards even when traded goods 
prices  rather  than  more  aggregated  indices are  used  as  the  basis  for  the 
calculation, yet it continues to run large current surpluses. 
To think about the role of shifts in traded goods PPP, it is necessary to shift 
to an  alternative  approach, one that  emphasizes the  imperfect  substitution 
among exportables from different industrial countries. 
4.2.2  Income Elasticities  and Secular Trends 
Although much theoretical literature in international economics is set in a 
general equilibrium framework with fairly complex production structures and 
many relative prices, the workhorse of practical trade balance analysis is still, 
as it was a generation ago, the partial equilibrium analysis of trade flows that 
are assumed to depend on real income and a single relative price. This frame- 
work can be defended  as a pretty close approximation  to a more carefully 
specified framework in which expenditure as well as income enters into import 
demand; in any case, since this framework is still the way most practical analysis 
is done, it will be used as the starting point here without much apology. 170  Paul R. Krugrnan 
Consider, then, a two-country world in which we define y,y* as domestic and 
foreign real output, p,p* as the prices in local currency of these outputs, and 
e as the price of foreign currency in terms of  domestic. Define r  = ep*/p as 
the real exchange rate, which  is in this case the price of  foreign relative to 
domestic  goods. Then the  standard  trade balance  model  may be written  as 
follows. Export volume depends on foreign output and the relative price of 
domestic goods: 
(2)  x  = x(y*,r). 
imports: 
(3)  rn  = rn(y,r). 
Import  volume  depends on  domestic  income  and  the  relative  price  of 
The trade balance (in domestic currency) may be written 
(4) 
so that the trade balance in terms of  domestic output is simply 
(5) 
Now it was pointed out in the 1950s by Johnson (1958) that if the framework 
given by equations (2)-(5)  is a reasonable description of  trade balance determ- 
nation, then economic growth is likely to require secular changes in real exchange 
rates. To see why, define the following. Let z,  = income elasticity of demand for 
exports; z,  = income elasticity of demand for imports; e,  = price elasticity of 
demand for exports; em = price elasticity of  demand for imports; y' = rate of 
growth of domestic output, that is, (dy/dr)ly;y*' = rate ofgrowth of foreignoutput; 
and r'  = rate of  real depreciation. 
B  = px - ep*m = p  (x -  rrn 1, 
b = x - rrn. 
Now differentiate equation (4). We  have 
(6)  dbldt  = x(z,y*' + elr'] -  rrn[z,ny' +  (1 - e,)r'] 
Suppose that initially b = 0, so that x  = rrn. Then in order to keep a zero 
trade balance, we must have 
(7)  zry*'  ~  z'"y'  +  (ex  + ern - 1)r' = 0. 
This implies a trend in the real exchange rate of 
(8)  r'  = (z,,y'  - zly*')/(ei  + em - 1) 
Equation (8) immediately identifies two reasons why there may be a trend 
in the equilibrium exchange rate: either countries may face different elasticities 
of  import and export demand, or they may have different long term rates of 
growth. More generally, there will be a trend in the real exchange rate unless 171  Equilibrium Exchange Rates 
which we would a priori imagine to be unlikely. 
Econometric estimates of trade equations along the lines of equations (2) and 
(3) generally find two things. First, price elasticities are fairly small. While a 
great deal of effort has gone into trying to push up price elasticity estimates, 
on the presumption that they are understated due to mismeasurement or long 
lags, standard  estimates remain  in  the  range  1-2.  This  implies that goods 
produced  in  different  countries  are  quite  imperfect  substitutes,  so  that 
differences in growth rates or in income elasticities can produce large secular 
trends in relative prices.  Second, there is indeed a wide spread of  estimated 
income elasticities. Tables 4.1 and 4.4 present two sets of estimates of income 
elasticities: the Houthakker-Magee estimates from 1969 and a more recent set 
from Krugman  (1988a). What is clear is that there is a very wide range of 
results. 
So we might expect to find that strong trends in equilibrium real exchange 
rates even when only traded goods are considered will be the norm rather than 
the exception. However, inspection of very long time series shows that this is 
less true than one might expect. For example, Frankel (1989) has computed 
the real (CPI) exchange rate between Britain and the United States since 1870. 
Instead of a gradual secular drift, the series gives the definite impression of a 
persistent mean reversion, which leaves the real exchange rate little changed 
over more than a century. 
Why does long-run PPP work as well as it does? The immediate answer is 
a systematic association between relative growth rates and apparent income 
elasticities, which I have called the “45-degree rule.”  The deeper explanation 
of the 45-degree rule is a more debatable issue. 
4.2.3  The 45-Degree Rule 
In 1969 Houthakker and Magee published a paper that remains a benchmark 
for  comparative  estimation  of  trade  equations  across  a  large  number  of 
countries. Their main conclusion was that there were large differences among 
countries in their relative income elasticities-specifically,  that Japan faced the 
highly  favorable  combination  of a high-income  elasticity of demand  for its 
exports and a low-income elasticity of import demand, while the United States 
and the United Kingdom faced the reverse. While Houthakker and Magee did 
of course notice that Japan was the fastest growing country in their sample, 
while the United States and the United Kingdom were the slowest, they did 
not explicitly consider the possibility that the differences in underlying growth 
rates  were  somehow  systematically  related  to  the  differences  in  estimated 
income  elasticities.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  escape  this  conclusion.  Table 4.1 
presents the Houthakker-Magee  income elasticity results for industrial coun- 
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Table 4.1  Income Elasticities and Growth Rates in the  1950s and 1960s 
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Source: Income elasticities from Houthakker and Magee (1969); growth rates from International 
Financial Statistics. 
Growth  rote, 55-65 
Fig. 4.4  Growth vs. elasticity ration, 1955-1965 
1955-65. The relationship is striking; it becomes even more so when the ratio 
zJzm  is graphed against y',  a plot shown in figure 4.4. 
Basically,  what  the  Houthakker-Magee results  show is that  equation  (9) 
holds-that  is, the ratio of income elasticities over their estimation period was 
such as to allow countries to have very different growth rates without strong 173  Equilibrium Exchange Rates 
trends  in  equilibrium  real  exchange rates.  This  may  be  confirmed  more 
formally,  by  regressing  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  Houthakker-Magee 
elasticity ratio on the national growth rates: 
ln(z,/z,)  = -  1.81 +  1.210 In(y’), 
(0.0208) 
R2 = 0.754, SEE = 0.211. 
In this regression we see that on average, if country A grew twice as rapidly 
as country B over the period  1955-65,  then country A turned out to have an 
estimated ratio of  export to import elasticities that  was twice that of  coun- 
try B. 
The result of this systematic relationship between growth rates and income 
elasticities was to make relative PPP hold much better than one would have 
expected if one assumed that income elasticities were identical, or distributed 
randomly.  One might  have expected  Japan  to need  to have rapidly  falling 
relative export prices in order to accommodate its extremely rapid economic 
growth-but  the  combination  of  high  export  elasticity  and  low  import 
elasticity took care of that. One might have expected the United Kingdom to 
receive compensation for its low growth rate by a secular appreciation of its 
real exchange rate-but  the combination  of  low  export elasticity  and  high 
import elasticity deprived it of  that benefit. 
A similar though less clear-cut relationship between growth rates and income 
elasticities is apparent in more recent data. (The reason the result is less clear 
is probably that the spread of growth rates has narrowed.) Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
report the results of  a set of standard export and import equations estimated 
for industrial countries on annual data for the period 1971  -86.  The dependent 
variables areX = manufactures exports in 1982 prices andM = manufactures 
imports in  1982 prices. The explanatory variables are Y  = GNP in constant 
prices; Y *  = foreign GNP  in constant prices, calculated as a geometric average 
of GNP in fourteen industrial countries, weighted by their 1978 shares of the 
exporting country’s exports; RXP = OECD index of relative export prices of 
manufactures; and RMP = relative price of manufactures imports, calculated 
as ratio of manufactures import unit value to GNP deflator. 
All data are from OECD Economic Outlook. All equations were estimated 
in log-linear form; where severe serial correlation was evident, a correction 
was made. 
By and large, these estimates look fairly decent; taken one at a time, they 
might suggest the need for more careful cleaning of  data, addition of some 
extra variables, etc., but they would not discourage a researcher from using 
the income and price elasticity framework. The major exception is the United 
Kingdom, whose import equation refuses to make sense; I have not been able 
to resolve this puzzle, and will drop the  United  Kingdom from subsequent 
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Table 4.2  Estimates of Export Equations, 1971 -19Ma 
Coefficients on 














































-  0.04 
(0.42) 















































"All equations estimated on annual data, 1971-86.  Standard errors. 
Table 4.3  Estimates of  Import Equations, 1971-1986 
Coefficients on 
Country  Y  RMP  RMP(-1)  SEE  R'  D-W  p 
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What we may note, however, is that there is still, as in the Houthakker-Magee 
(1969)  results,  a  systematic  tendency  for  high-growth  countries  to  face 
favorable  income  elasticities.  Table  4.4 presents  a  summary  of  estimated 
income elasticities, their ratios, and growth rates (calculated by fitting trends 
to domestic and foreign GNP). When these results are plotted in figure 4.5, 
the  result  is  less  striking  than  for  the  Houthakker-Magee  data  in  figure 
4.4-partly  because the spread of  growth rates is smaller-but  the upward- 
sloping relationship is still apparent. On average the 45-degree rule continues 
to hold, although with much less confidence: 
In(zJz,)  =  -0.00  +  1.029 In  (y’/y*’), 
R2 = 0.322, SEE = 0.401. 
(0.609) 
Perhaps a more illuminating test is to look at the way in which estimates 
changed from the earlier period to the later period.  In the  1950s and  1960s, 
as Houthakker and Magee (1969) noted, Japan was the country with highly 
favorable  income  elasticities,  while  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom were the countries disfavored. In the  1970s and  1980s there was a 
general convergence  of growth rates.  European  growth rates declined more 
than  those  of  the  United  States, so that the  United  States grew  almost  as 
rapidly as its trading partners; Japan, though still fast growing, was not as far 
out  of  line  as  before.  If  there  is  some  systematic  reason  why  income 
elasticities seem to match relative growth rates, we should expect to find a 
decline in  Japan’s  zx/z,  ratio  and  a rise  in  that of  the  United  States.  And 
indeed  we do find this:  according to the estimates made here,  Japan’s ratio 
of  elasticities,  while  still  high,  is  lower  in  my  estimates  than  in  the 
Houthakker-Magee  results,  while the United  States actually is estimated to 
have a zxlzm  ratio greater than one. 
Table 4.4  Income Elasticities and Growth Rates, 1970- 1986 
Growth Rate of  GNP  Income Elasticity 
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0.90  3.86 
0.94  2.15 
0.98  1.24 
1.08  2.41 
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Fig. 4.5  Growth vs. elasticity ratio, 1970-1986 
Clearly something is going on here.  It seems unlikely  that the systematic 
association of growth rates and income elasticities is a pure coincidence. So 
our next  step is to turn to potential explanations. 
4.2.4  Why Does PPP Work So Well  in the Long Run? 
There is a basic puzzle in relating short-run and long-run real exchange rate 
behavior. In the short run, PPP can be decisively rejected: both direct evidence 
on relative price behavior,  as in Figure 4.2, and examination of  econometric 
trade equations clearly demonstrate that goods produced in different countries 
are very imperfect substitutes. Yet in the long run, PPP works fairly well; this 
is reconciled with the low price elasticities of trade equations by the 45-degree 
rule, which systematically relates income elasticities to relative growth rates. 
The obvious candidate for an explanation  of  the  45-degree rule  lies  in 
supply-side  effects.  In  Krugman  (1988a)  it  is  argued  that  conventional 
supply-side effects arising  simply  from outward shifts of  supply curves, or 
even more complex effects arising from biased growth, cannot explain the kind 
of result that we see in the data. Instead, it is necessary to appeal to more exotic 
stories.  Specifically,  the 45-degree  rule  can  be  explained  if  we  argue that 
specialization among industrial countries is primarily due to increasing returns 
rather than comparative advantage; in this case goods currently produced by 
the industrial countries might be quite poor substitutes, but rough equality of 
(say) unit labor costs is enforced in the long run by the possibility that growing 
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The story runs  as follows. Fast growing  countries expand  their  share of 
world  markets, not  by  reducing  the relative  prices  of  their goods,  but  by 
expanding the range of goods that they produce as their economies grow. What 
we measure  as exports and imports are not  really  fixed  sets of  goods, but 
instead  aggregates  whose  definitions  change over time  as more  goods are 
added to the list. What we call “Japanese exports” is a meaningful aggregate 
facing  a downward sloping  demand curve at any point  in time; but  as the 
Japanese economy grows over time, the definition of  that aggregate changes 
in such a way as to make the apparent demand curve shift outward. The result 
is to produce apparently favorable income elasticities that allow the country to 
expand its economy without the need for a secular real depreciation. 
Krugman (1988a) offers as an illustrative example the case of trade between 
Dixit-Stiglitz-type  economies that grow at different rates. The relative prices 
of representative  goods produced in each country will remain unchanged, so 
all differences  in export and import growth rates  would  be  attributed by  a 
conventional  econometric  analysis  to  income  elasticity  differences.  It  is 
straightforward  to show that  in  this  case econometric estimates will  show 
precisely a 45-degree rule. 
Admittedly, this suggested link between new trade theory, with its emphasis on 
noncomparative advantage  specialization,  and long-run real exchange rate be- 
havior, is speculative. (I of course have a particular stake in its validity.) It does, 
however, have the virtue of providing a theoretical rationale for the deep-seated 
feeling of many international economists that PPP, however grossly violated it is 
in the short run, has substantially more validity in the very long run. 
4.3  Exchange Rates and the Adjustment Process 
We have seen that long-run secular trends in equilibrium exchange rates are 
probably less prevalent than one might have thought a priori, and that thus in 
the long run PPP may be a better guide than evidence of  low price elasticities 
would have led one to conclude. However, much policy must still be made for 
the short and medium run, where an assurance that things will work out over 
a span of  decades is not much help. Also, real shocks and secular trends still 
do shift equilibrium real exchange rates, so that the problem of adjusting to an 
appropriate  real rate is still an issue. 
Thus even given the long-run results suggested  in the previous  section, it 
remains important to ask the traditional question of the role of exchange rates 
in  the  adjustment  process.  Suppose that  a  country has  a  current account 
imbalance that it believes to be undesirable and unsustainable.  What role can 
or should the exchange rate play in adjusting this imbalance? 
This  is  actually  a  straightforward  question,  one which  economists have 
understood  well  since the  1950s. However, recently  the issue  has become 
confused again. The reasons for this are puzzling; some economists have fallen 
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while  others  seem to  have  become  so  preoccupied  with  the  subtleties  of 
intertemporal models that they have lost touch with the basics. In any case, it 
seems necessary  to restate  the  nature  of  the  useful role  that exchange rate 
adjustment can play in balance of  payments  adjustment. 
4.3.1  Expenditure-switching  versus Expenditure-reducing 
The main  source of  confusion in the  discussion  of  balance of  payments 
adjustment  has  always been  the  fact  that  a country’s balance of  payments 
depends  on at  least  two  variables,  and  that  a  country  with  a  balance  of 
payments  concern  always has  at  least  one  other objective.  The  minimal 
situation is that of a country whose current account depends on both the level 
of  domestic demand and the real exchange rate, and which cares both about 
the current account and the level of domestic employment. 
Figure 4.6 reproduces the familiar diagrammatic exposition introduced by 
Swan (1963). On the axes are real domestic demand (“absorption”) and the 
real exchange rate (measured  here so that a rise represents  a higher relative 
price for domestic goods). The line XX represents  combinations  of  demand 
and  the  real  exchange rate  such that  the  current  account is  at  some level 
regarded as desirable and/or sustainable; this is “external balance.”  The line 
I1  represents  points  where domestic resources  are  fully  employed; this  is 
“internal  balance.”  The line  XX  is  downward  sloping  because  a  rise  in 
domestic demand, other things equal, will  increase  imports and siphon off 
exports; it must therefore be offset by a real depreciation to keep the current 
account  unchanged. The line I1  is  upward  sloping  because  an  increase  in 
domestic  demand will  raise  the demand for domestic output, unless  a real 
appreciation shifts demand away from domestic goods. Each zone off the lines 
Real exchange rate 
I  X 
I  X 
1 
Real  domestic demand 
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is characterized by a particular sort of  disequilibrium. For example, points to 
the right of the equilibrium point E are characterized by over-full employment 
and hence inflationary pressure, together with a balance of payments deficit. 
The rough characterization  of the United States with an overvalued dollar 
was that it was at a point like D: on the internal balance line,  because un- 
employment was fairly close to the level regarded  as compatible with price 
stability, but with an unsustainable  current account deficit. To correct such a 
problem requires both a real depreciation and a reduction in domestic demand. 
Either alone leads to difficulties: a reduction in demand alone, that is, a move 
left from D, would  improve the trade problem but  lead to increased  unem- 
ployment. A real depreciation without any fall in demand, that is, a move down 
from D, would improve the trade problem but threaten inflation (this may be 
in the process of happening). Thus real depreciation and demand reduction are 
necessary complements. 
This seems a straightforward and sensible enough analysis. Why has it come 
under attack? A  number  of  writers, including  most  particularly  McKinnon 
(1984), Mundell (1987), and the editorial staff of the Wall Street Journal, have 
argued that real depreciation  is either unnecessary  or impossible  to achieve 
through  nominal  depreciation. Although  this  view  is a regression  from an 
understanding  that one thought had been achieved and reopens an issue that 
ought to have been closed, it is influential and apparently persuasive enough 
to warrant some discussion. 
4.3.2  Is Real Exchange Rate Adjustment  Necessary? 
The main focus of the attack on the need for real exchange rate adjustment 
is on the  savings-investment  identity, X  -  M  = S -  I. This says that  the 
current account deficit is necessarily identical to the gap between savings and 
investment.  The conclusion that many seem to have drawn is that this means 
that trade problems are purely financial problems, that an increase in savings 
will translate into a reduce external deficit without any need for real exchange 
rates to change. Indeed, McKinnon has repeatedly asserted that real exchange 
rate changes are necessary only in a world with limited capital mobility; once 
there is free movement of capital, changes in the savings-investment balance 
are reflected directly in trade, without the need to consider price elasticities. 
It  should be  immediately  apparent  what  is wrong  with this  argument; it 
neglects the question of what goods expenditure falls on. Figure 4.6 is entirely 
consistent  with  the  savings-investment  identity,  but  it  adds the  additional 
information that a fall in domestic demand will fall at least partly on domestic 
goods, leading to an excess supply that must be offset by a fall in these goods’ 
relative price.  Ultimately trade flows reflect real demands for real goods and 
services, and no amount of  emphasis on the financial side should be allowed 
to gloss over that basic truth. 
Now there is a more sophisticated argument about why real exchange rate 
changes might not be necessary,  one that actually goes back to the Keynes- 
Ohlin debate over the transfer problem. Suppose that the United States reduces 180  Paul R.  Krugrnan 
its real  expenditure by  100 billion  constant dollars.  By  the  world  budget 
identity, other countries must increase their expenditure correspondingly.  In 
principle  other countries  could  increase  their  demand for  U.S.  goods and 
services by enough to compensate for the reduced domestic demand, even at 
a  constant  real  exchange rate.  In  this  case no  real  depreciation  would  be 
necessary. 
Is this  likely? The question is  precisely  that  which  arises  in  the  classic 
transfer problem: how does the marginal propensity of  U.  S . residents to spend 
on U.S. goods compare with  that  of  foreign residents?  In  a  perfectly  in- 
tegrated  world  inhabited  by  people  with  identical  homothetic  preferences, 
these  marginal  propensities  would  be  the  same. In the real  world,  which 
remains very imperfectly  integrated, there is no reasonable  doubt that U.S. 
residents spend a much higher fraction of any marginal change in spending on 
U.S. goods. 
Tautologically, the answer may be regarded as the product of two terms: the 
share of imports in expenditure and the elasticity of imports with respect to 
expenditure. 
First, we ask what share of  U.S. expenditure falls on foreign goods. One 
might be inclined to answer with the share of imports in GNP, or in GNP plus 
the trade deficit (to take account of the fact that expenditure currently exceeds 
income): that is, about 11 percent.  This is not a very large number given the 
alarms being raised about international competition  in the United States, but 
it is in any case the wrong number; it is too large by a factor of perhaps two. 
On average, U.S. residents probably spend only 5 or 6 percent of their income 
on  imports.  The  reason  is  that  something  like  half  of  U.S.  imports  are 
intermediate goods. The spending on  these goods is presumably related to U.S. 
output rather than expenditure; this makes an important difference, as we will 
see, and this needs to be kept separate. 
Next,  we poll  the  econometricians for  an  elasticity.  Import  demand  is 
generally  estimated  to rise  more than  proportionally to  whatever  activity 
variable the econometrician puts in, for fairly obvious reasons: goods, which 
are  traded  more  than  services,  respond  more  to  cyclical  fluctuations  in 
spending, and capacity constraints cause some of an increase in demand to spill 
over into imports. However, the typical elasticity of imports with respect to 
spending or income is usually around 2 and rarely more than 3. 
Putting these together, we find that  a generous estimate of the share of  a 
marginal dollar spent on imports will still be less than 20 cents. Taking a round 
number, then, let us suppose that U.S. residents spend 80 percent of a marginal 
dollar on U.S. goods. What about foreign residents? 
Here we note that the United States is less than a third of  the world market 
economy. Thus even in normal times, when U.S. trade is roughly balanced, 
U.S. exports constitute only about 5 percent of  the income of the rest of the 
world, and less of their final expenditure. Again a generous estimate might be 
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Thus a minimal estimate is that U.S. residents spend eight times as high a 
share of  a marginal increase in spending on U.S. goods than do foreigners. 
This disparity is no doubt smaller than it ever was-but  in an important sense 
we are still closer to a world in which all of a spending shift falls on domestic 
goods than we are to one in which spending is fully internationalized. 
Now  return  to  our assumed  case,  in  which  U.S.  residents  reduce  their 
expenditure by $100 billion, while foreign residents correspondingly increase 
their expenditure by the same amount. The results are illustrated in table 4.5. 
Case A in table 4.5 shows what happens,  all else equal, if U.S. spending 
falls by  $100 billion  and  rest of  world  (ROW) spending rises  by  the  same 
amount. The key point is that, as we have argued, U.S. residents have a much 
higher marginal propensity to spend on U.S. goods than ROW  residents. When 
U.S. spending falls by $100 billion,  U.S. spending on imports falls by  only 
$20 billion, while domestic demand for U.S. goods falls by $80 billion. The 
increase in ROW spending provides a new source of demand for U.S. exports, 
but not nearly  enough: out of the $100 billion  rise in  ROW spending,  only 
$10 billion falls on U.S. products. The result, then, is to produce a $70 billion 
excess supply of U.S. goods and a $70 billion excess demand for ROW goods. 
How  are  we  to  make the  redistribution  of  world  expenditure  effective? 
Somehow the world needs to be persuaded to switch $70 billion of spending 
from ROW goods to U.S. goods. The only nonprotectionist way to do this is 
to make U.S. goods relatively cheaper. That is, we need real depreciation of 
the United States against the rest of the world. 
The reason  why  this  real  depreciation  is  needed  is precisely  that  world 
markets for goods and services are imperfectly integrated, so that residents of 
each country have a much higher propensity to spend on their own products 
than foreigners have to spend on that country’s products.  So the microeco- 
nomic fact of an imperfectly integrated world market has the macroeconomic 
implication that real exchange rate changes are an essential part of the balance 
of payments adjustment process. 
Because  of  the  imperfect  integration  of  world  markets  for  goods  and 
services,  then, current  account  adjustment  does require real  exchange  rate 
adjustment.  However,  it is not  necessary that  this occur through a nominal 
depreciation of the dollar. Instead of dollar decline, we could achieve the same 
Table 4.5 
Case  Total Spending  Spending on U.S. Products  Spending on Row Products 
Reducing a Trade Imbalance 
A: 
U.S.  -  100 
ROW  + 100 
U.S.  -  100 
ROW  + 800 
B: 
-  80 
+ 10 
~  80 
+  80 
-  20 
+  90 
~  20 
+  720 182  Paul R. Krugman 
result through  a combination  of  deflation in the United  States and  inflation 
abroad. The need for real exchange rate adjustment is only a case for nominal 
exchange rate flexibility if relative prices and wages are more easily altered 
through  exchange rate changes than  through  differential  price  level  move- 
ments. But it was shown earlier in this paper that substantial stickiness of prices 
and  wages  in  domestic currency is  in  fact  a  major  feature  of  the  world 
economy. Because there is in fact inertia to nominal prices, it is easier to reduce 
the relative price of  U.S. labor and output via a dollar depreciation  than via 
U.S. deflation. Thus the case for real exchange rate changes in the adjustment 
process  is  also a case for nominal  exchange rate  changes to facilitate  this 
adjustment. 
4.3.3  The Role of  Growth in Surplus Countries 
In the numerical illustration in part A of table 4.5, it is assumed that the fall 
in U.S. expenditure is matched by only an equal rise in ROW expenditure. 
Many  in  the  United  States  have  argued,  however,  that  growth  in  surplus 
countries-which  means a rise in ROW expenditure over and above the fall in 
U.S. expenditure, whether  they realize  it or not-should  take  the place of 
exchange rate adjustment. This is a point that is correct conceptually, but there 
just isn’t much in it as a practical matter. I want to return to table 4.5, part B, 
in order to see why. 
Let us pose the following question: How much would foreign expenditure 
have to rise in order to allow the United  States to cut expenditure by $100 
billion and convert all of that cut into a trade balance improvement, without 
the  need  for a real  depreciation  to induce a  switch of  expenditure to  U.S. 
goods? The answer is  shown in part B. Since the fall in U.S.  expenditure 
reduces the demand for U.S. goods by $80 billion,  and we are assuming that 
only 10 percent of a marginal increase in ROW spending falls on U.S. goods, 
expenditure in the rest of the world must rise by $800 billion. In this way the 
total spending on U.S. goods is left unchanged, with the decline in domestic 
demand offset by an equal increase in export demand. 
Unfortunately,  there is a side consequence: the total expenditure on ROW 
goods rises by $700 billion-$720  billion increase in domestic demand minus 
the $20 billion fall in U.S. exports. Thus the alternative to U.S. depreciation 
offered here will work only if there is at least $700 billion of usable excess 
capacity in the rest of the world. At current exchange rates, the GNP  of market 
economies outside the United States is about $9 trillion, so this means that to 
improve the U.S.  trade position by $100 billion using foreign growth  as an 
alternative to real depreciation would require that we find room for an increase 
of almost 8 percent in ROW  GNP. If we were to try to deal with the whole U.S. 
trade deficit in this way, the needed  foreign growth  would be more like  12 
percent. 
The problem should be immediately obvious-there  isn’t that much excess 
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industrial  countries  with  current  account  surpluses  have  a  usable  excess 
capacity  of  more than  2 percent  of GNP. This result  may  perhaps be chal- 
lenged,  but what  matters is what  the policymakers  in the  surplus countries 
believe; and the fact is that the authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
in particular, regard themselves as having only small room for expansion at 
best.  So the possibility  of  substituting  growth  in  surplus countries  for real 
exchange rate adjustment, while correct in principle, is only a minor issue in 
the current context. 
4.4  Problems of Assessment 
The  expenditure-switching  versus  expenditure-reducing  framework  de- 
scribed in the previous section would offer a straightforward guide to exchange 
rate  policy  if  there  were  neither  structural  change  that  shifted equilibrium 
exchange rates, nor lags in the effects of exchange rates on trade.  Unfortu- 
nately, in reality both structural change and lags are key issues. Arguably, both 
have become even more serious issues in the  1980s than before. As a result, 
the  assessment of equilibrium  exchange rates remains  a difficult  and prob- 
lematic exercise. 
4.4.1  Does the Dollar Need to Fall Further? 
As it happens, the current perplexity over the appropriate adjustment of the 
U.S.  dollar  provides  a  nice  example of  how  uncertainty  about  lags  and 
structural change interact to make determination of appropriate exchange rate 
policy  very  difficult.  Suppose that  we apply  figure 4.6 to  U.S. experience 
during the  1980s. 
Suppose that there were neither structural change nor lags in the effects of 
the exchange rate. Then we would be able to draw internal and external balance 
schedules for the United  States. In  1980, the United  States was  near  most 
estimates  of  the  NAIRU,  and  running  a  slight  current  surplus;  thus  the 
economy was at a point like D. By  1985, a massive expansion  in domestic 
demand had been matched by a large dollar appreciation; economic recovery 
had raised employment back to a level approaching some estimates of the full 
employment level, so that the economy appeared to be at a point like E, on 
the internal balance line but with an external deficit. 
Now as figure 4.6 shows, what has happened since 1985 is that the United 
States has experienced a substantial real depreciation that, depending on one’s 
measure,  has either brought the real exchange rate back to its  1980 level or 
brought it well below that level, without a corresponding fall in real demand 
relative to output. So the current situation ought to be represented by a point 
like F. In the absence of structural change or lags, we would expect to find a 
combination of  persistence of  the external deficit to at least some extent and 
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To  some extent this  has  happened. The U.S.  trade  deficit  has declined 
considerably  in volume terms, and somewhat in dollar terms, while unem- 
ployment has fallen to levels that are somewhat below earlier estimates of  the 
NAIRU.  However,  both  the  negative  and  positive  effects  of  the  real 
depreciation  have  been  smaller than  widely  expected. To  make  the  point, 
consider that constant  dollar real expenditure in the United  States currently 
exceeds constant-dollar  output by approximately  four percent. Suppose that 
in 1980 one had suddenly increased real expenditure in the United States by 
4 percent. One would have expected this to have a substantial negative effect 
on the  external  balance, but  not  to be  reflected  almost  one-for-one  in  the 
external deficit.  One would  also have expected a severe overheating  of  the 
domestic  economy.  The  point  is  that  the  external  deficit  is  larger-that 
the dollar’s real depreciation has had less effect-than  figure 4.6 alone would 
suggest. 
Why should this be? Unfortunately there are two possible explanations. One 
is that the XX and  I1 schedules have shifted in  such a way as to reduce the 
equilibrium exchange rate; in effect, the declining dollar has been chasing a 
moving  target. The other  is that  there  are  long lags in the  effect of  dollar 
decline, perhaps longer than in the past. The first explanation suggests that the 
dollar needs to decline  substantially  from its current  level; the second, that 
what is needed is more patience. 
The case for a decline  in the equilibrium dollar has been  advanced  by  a 
number of economists. It rests on the observation that at least four elements 
of the world environment have changed in ways that reduce the U.S. net export 
position at any given real exchange rate. These are: a) the continued relative 
decline  of  the  U.S.  advantage in  technology  over advanced  rivals,  which 
deprives the United States of the ability to sell goods at a premium; b) the debt 
crisis, which has reduced  LDC imports from the world at large but dispro- 
portionately from the United States; c) slow growth in Europe, which has also 
depressed demand for U.S. exports; and d) the shift of  the United States into 
net debtor status, which has eliminated the former U.S. surplus in investment 
income. 
Added to these factors is the possible role of  “hysteresis”  in trade: U.S. 
firms may have lost markets during the period of the strong dollar which it is 
not worth their while to recapture even with a return of the dollar to its original 
level. 
By placing maximum weight on all of these factors, it is possible to make 
a  case  that  the  U.S.  dollar  needs  as  much  as  a  20  or  even  30  percent 
depreciation below its 1980 level to be consistent with restoration of external 
balance. 
On the other side, however, is the argument that such large shifts from PPP 
are rare historically,  and that  in time the  United  States should  not  have to 
depreciate its currency to a level that makes production costs radically lower 
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are seeing is  long  lags  in  adjustment,  and  that  given  time there  will  be 
substantial further narrowing of the U.S. trade imbalance even at the current 
value of the dollar. 
Ideally,  econometric estimates of  trade  equations  would  identify  lags. 
However, in practice this is difficult. Furthermore, there are some reasons to 
believe that the lags themselves may have changed. That is, lags in exchange 
rate responses  may have become longer in recent years. 
4.4.2  Uncertainty  and Lags in the Impact of Exchange Rates 
A striking feature of the period since 1985 has been the determination  of 
non-U.S.  firms in holding on to markets gained during the period  1980-85, 
despite a radical  worsening  of  their  relative  cost  position. U.S.  firms  also 
seem to have been reluctant to take advantage of the weaker dollar to attempt 
to regain  lost  markets.  And  multinational  firms,  wherever  they  are based, 
have been reluctant to reverse their location decisions from the strong dollar 
period. 
One explanation of  this lack of response to the weak dollar is that firms do 
not regard the current exchange rate as permanent, that they expect the dollar 
to return to levels of a few years ago. A broader explanation, however, which 
need  not  be  specific  to the dollar,  is that  uncertainty per  se makes firms 
reluctant to respond to the exchange rate, and hence increases the lags in trade 
responses  to the exchange rate.  This point  has  been  emphasized in  recent 
theoretical work by Dixit  (1  988) and is emphasized in a practical context by 
Krugman (1988b). 
The point  may  be  made by  considering a  simple hypothetical  example. 
Consider a hypothetical Japanese firm that has lost its cost advantage over U.S. 
rivals as the result of the strong yen. At the current exchange rate-say  120 
yen  to the  dollar-it  is losing  money on its  U.S.  sales. This  firm  is  not 
especially  optimistic; it hopes that the yen may return to 140, which would 
make it profitable again, but regards it as equally likely that the yen will rise 
to 100,  greatly increasing its losses. If that were the whole story, the firm would 
simply exit immediately.  However, the firm has invested heavily in building 
its U.S. market position, and it knows that if it abandons that position now 2 
will not be worth trying to regain it even if  the yen does fall. 
Table 4.6 shows some hypothetical  numbers for this Japanese firm. We 
suppose that, at the current rate of  120 yen, it is losing money at an annual 
rate of $100 million. If the yen goes back to 140, it will be able to make $100 
Table 4.6  Payoffs to a Firm Delaying Exit 
Value of  Yen  Initial Year Loss  PDV of Later Years 
100  -  100  0 
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million annually; if the yen rises to 100, it will lose $300 million per year if 
it still tries to hand on. Also, we suppose that the firm discounts future earnings 
at an annual rate of  10 percent. 
The expected returns to this firm from sales in the U.S. market are clearly 
negative. However, the firm does not have to choose between leaving the U.S. 
market now and staying forever; its immediate choice is whether to exit now 
or wait a year, then choose again. And we can show that despite current losses 
the firm should hang in there for one more year. 
Table 4.6 shows the returns to the firm if it chooses not to drop out and to wait 
instead for a year before making its decision. In the first year the firm loses $100 
million. In the second year it drops out if the yen goes to 100, but stays in if  it 
falls to 140. In this latter case, it will earn $100 million per year thereafter, with 
a present value discounted to the first year of $900 million. The overall expected 
present value to the firm of  this wait-and-see strategy is therefore the average 
between what happens if the yen goes to 100 or to 140: $350 million. 
By contrast, if the firm immediately  drops out  it makes nothing and loses 
nothing. 
Clearly, in an expected value sense, the firm is better off holding on and 
hoping for better times even though it is losing money at the current exchange 
rate, and even though it regards an adverse movement in the rate as being as 
likely us a favorable movement. Of course, if the firm regarded a return to 140 
as more likely than a rise to 100, the case for remaining  in the market in the 
face of  losses would be even stronger. 
Uncertainty,  then,  makes  firms  cautious  about  exiting  from  hard-won 
market positions. Similar examples will show that a U.S. firm will be hesitant 
about taking advantage of low costs to break into a market, and for that matter 
will make multinational  firms hesitant about relocating production. 
4.5  Conclusions 
Experience and analysis have taught us a great deal about how a system of 
flexible exchange rates works. Unfortunately, we still do not know enough to 
give clear and simple advice in all circumstances to central bankers and finance 
ministers.  In  particular,  the current  situation  is one in  which  an intelligent 
appreciation  of  what  we  know  about equilibrium exchange rates  leads to a 
definite “don’t know” in response to questions about where to go from here. 
What we do know are three things, in particular.  First, nominal exchange 
rates matter. There is now overwhelming evidence for stickiness of prices in 
domestic  currency,  and the persistence  of  real  exchange rate fluctuations  is 
more likely evidence for slow price adjustment than it is for the prevalence of 
real shocks. Second, in the very long run, PPP works better than one might 
expect, possibly because of supply-side effects involving scale economies and 
product differentiation.  Third, despite this, in the medium term the combi- 
nation of  strong  distribution  effects and  fairly  low  price  elasticities  makes 
exchange rate changes an essential part of the adjustment process. 187  Equilibrium Exchange Rates 
The source of  current  perplexity  is the difficulty  of  untangling  different 
sources of change. Are the disappointing results of dollar depreciation due to 
structural changes or simply stretched-out lags? This is the key issue; at least 
by focusing on it we have a better chance of  getting the right policy. 
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Comment  C.  Fred Bergsten 
Paul  Krugman  has  provided  an outstanding  analysis of  how  exchange rate 
changes contribute to the international adjustment process. His paper offers a 
C. Fred Bergsten is the director of  the Institute for International Economics 188  Paul R. Krugman 
number of useful insights both for our intellectual understanding of the issue 
and for the continuing  debate over exchange-rate policy. 
In  particular,  Krugman underlines and reinforces the traditional view that 
currency changes can, and indeed must, play a central role in restoring  and 
maintaining sustainable combinations of internal and external balance. As he 
notes, some observers have become disillusioned with the pace and magnitude 
of the decline in the external deficit of the United States (and the corresponding 
surpluses in Japan and Germany) despite the sizable fall of the dollar since 
early 1985. He cites a number of considerations to help explain this result and 
could have added several more. 
First, most  models show that  the American  current  account deficit  was 
headed toward annual levels of $300-$400  billion  when the dollar was at its 
peak in early 1985.’ Halting the deterioration at less than $150 billion in 1987, 
and subsequently cutting it by at least $20 billion  in nominal terms (and by 
much more in real terms), has thus been a considerable  achievement. 
Second,  most  analyses fail  to take  full  account of  the  implications  for 
achieving equilibrium of large initial imbalances. In the case of  the United 
States, merchandise  exports were  only 60  percent  as large  as merchandise 
imports when the deficit peaked in  1987. Hence exports had to grow almost 
twice as fast as imports simply to avoid further increases in the deficit. The 
gap was even more dramatic in the case of the bilateral United States-Japan 
imbalance  because  Japanese exports  were  almost  three  times greater  than 
American exports in  1987. 
Third, many analyses fail to distinguish between real and nominal responses 
to currency changes and to the wide disparity between them. Cline remedies 
this  problem  and  suggests  that, for the United  States, an improvement  of 
$100 billion in the nominal current account balance will require an adjustment 
of  almost  $200 billion  in  real  terms.’  Indeed, the  U.S.  deficit  by  the  first 
quarter of  1989 had been cut by about 43 percent in real terms from its peak 
in the third quarter of  1986. The observed “sluggishness”  of  the response of 
the nominal deficit to a lower dollar thus masks much more substantial volume 
gains, which of  course are of  primary significance for the key variables in the 
real  economy-growth,  production, employment-and  thus  probably  trade 
policy, though not for the financing of the imbalance. 
Fourth, despite repeated international commitments to decisively reduce the 
budget  deficit  and  despite the  existence  of  the  Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
legislation, the United States failed at least through 1988 to complement dollar 
depreciation  with  adequate cutbacks  in  the  growth  of  domestic  demand. 
Domestic demand in fact continued to grow as rapidly, or more rapidly, than 
productive capacity.  Supply constraints  reportedly  limited the expansion of 
exports in a number of   sector^.^ 
Moreover,  once the economy reached  full employment and full capacity 
utilization by around the middle of 1988 (if not earlier), resources would have 
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cost of a further acceleration of inflation. The Federal Reserve thus responded 
by tightening monetary policy, inter alia halting the depreciation of the dollar 
and in fact pushing it back up. 
This fifth point-uncertainty  on the part of the private sector concerning the 
future course of the exchange rate itself-is  raised by Krugman but deserves 
even greater emphasis. Many American exporters, when asked why they have 
failed to expand productive capacity to satisfy both domestic and rising foreign 
demand, reply that they have no confidence that the exchange rate of the dollar 
would still be at a level permitting them to remain competitive internationally 
by  the time the new capacity would come on stream. 
Hysteresis  thus has a critical  time  dimension. Krugman and  others have 
argued that currencies probably need to overshoot to persuade firms to reenter 
export (and import-competing) markets.  In addition, these firms may require 
assurances that exchange rates which permit them to compete will remain in 
place  for some time.  Indeed,  there  is  presumably  a  tradeoff  between  the 
magnitude of the needed depreciation  and its expected duration. 
This  suggests the  need  for systemic reform,  to install  and  maintain  an 
exchange rate regime that will offer such assurances. Here Krugman, despite 
calling  for  broad  target  zones  in  his  widely  praised  Robbins   lecture^,^ 
concludes with surprising agnosticism that  “we still do not know enough to 
give clear and simple advice in all circumstances to central bankers and finance 
ministers” and “what we know about equilibrium exchange rates leads to a 
definite ‘don’t know’ in response to questions about where to go from here.” 
Fortunately,  the situation  is not nearly  so hopeless. Krugman has in fact 
slightly (but crucially) misspecified the problem: it is not whether economists 
can advise officials what to do “in all circumstances” but whether we can with 
some  confidence  offer  them  a  system  which  promises  to  perform  more 
effectively than either pure floating or the loose ‘‘reference ranges”  installed 
with the Louvre Accord of February  1987.’ 
On this more modest criterion, there is growing evidence for the superiority 
of a system of target zones. Such a regime has been developed in detail, and 
simulated  against  recent  history,  by  Williamson and  Miller (  1987).6 Both 
Branson and Frankel, in their presentations to this conference, indicate that the 
Williamson-Miller  “blueprint”  performs  better  than  any  of  the  proposed 
alternatives (or the status quo).’  As noted, Krugman has previously endorsed 
such an approach  (and rightly stresses in his present paper the high costs of 
permitting wrong nominal rates to persist). 
Such  a  system  rests  explicitly  on the  view that  the  exchange rate is an 
intermediate  target,  to  be  used  to  achieve  and  maintain  current  account 
positions  that  are  agreed  internationally  to  be  sustainable  in  economic, 
financial, and policy (e.g., anti-protection) terms. Krugman’s “most basic of 
these  [exchange-rate] difficulties”  should thus be restated:  the hardest task, 
both intellectually and politically, will be to agree on targets for external and 
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that  will  help  produce  such outcomes,  satisfying  Krugman’s dictum that 
policymakers  can greatly facilitate  adjustment by  inducing  nominal  rates to 
move  toward  equilibrium  once they  know  where  equilibrium lies.  Such a 
regime of  course rejects the utility of purchasing power parity calculations for 
any practical purpose, for the reasons brilliantly developed in the paper, thus 
rendering  even the  yen  zone (over which  Krugman puzzles)  susceptible  to 
successful targeting. 
Installing  such zones in practice  is a much trickier matter,  however.  The 
recent efforts of the Group of Seven to stabilize flexible exchange rates reveal 
that they are willing to try only “around current  level^."^ The authorities have 
been unable to find a technique to simultaneously alter levels and stabilize, as 
they could under fixed exchange rate regimes past (Bretton Woods) and present 
(European Monetary System), and there are admittedly great uncertainties as 
to whether such efforts could succeed within a context that continued to permit 
considerable rate flexibility. Hence any lasting monetary reform will probably 
have to be a two-step process, addressed initially to establishing equilibrium 
rates by completing the realignment begun in 1985 (perhaps through a “second 
Plaza agreement”’)  and subsequently  moving to a system of target zones to 
maintain equilibrium for the longer run. 
Notes 
1. Marris (1987, 86) foresaw a deficit of $320 billion by  1990 with further increases 
thereafter. Simulations with the Federal Reserve’s Helkie-Hooper model show a deficit 
of over $400 billion by  1992 if the real exchange rate of the dollar had remained at its 
first-quarter 1985 level; see Cline (1989, 33). 
2. See Cline (1989, ch. 6, especially 269-70). 
3. A detailed proposal for linking the external and internal components of  a U.S. 
4. See Krugman (1988, especially  104-6). 
5. See Funabashi (1988, especially ch. 8). 
6. See Williamson and Miller (1987). 
7. See also Currie and Wren-Lewis (1989, especially  199-200). 
8. See Funabashi (1988,  183-86). 
9. See Bergsten (1989). 
adjustment strategy can be found in Bergsten (1988, especially ch. 4 and 5). 
References 
Bergsten,  C. Fred.  1988. America  in the world economy: A strategy for the 1990s. 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, November. 
-.  1989.  U.S. priority  objectives  for  the  Paris  Summit:  A  “Second  Plaza 
Agreement”  and  the  Uruguay  Round.  Statement  before  the  Joint  Economic 
Committee, U.S. Congress, July 6. 
Cline, William R. 1989. United States external adjustment and the world economy. 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,  March. 
Currie, David, and Simon Wren-Lewis.  1989. A comparison of alternative regimes for 
international macropolicy coordination.  In Marcus Miller, Barry Eichengreen, and 
Richard Portes, eds., Blueprints for exchange rate management. London: Academic 
Press. 191  Equilibrium Exchange Rates 
Funabashi,  Yoichi.  1988.  Managing  the  dollar:  From  the  Plaza  to  the  Louvre. 
Krugman,  Paul.  1988. Exchange  rate instability. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Marris, Stephen.  1987. Dejicits and the dollar: The world economy at risk. Washing- 
ton, DC: Institute for International Economics,  rev. August. 
Williamson, John, and Marcus H. Miller.  1987. Targets and indicators: A blueprint for 
the international  coordination of  economic policy.  Washington,  DC:  Institute for 
International Economics, September. 
Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, May. 
Comment  Michael Mussa 
It  is  a  pleasure, once again,  to comment on  a  stimulating  paper  by  Paul 
Krugman. The last time I had such an opportunity was at a conference held 
in Grand Teton National Park in August  1985. On that occasion, I noted that 
the view of  the Teton Range across Jackson Lake provided  an  appropriate 
setting in which to discuss the recent turbulent behavior of exchange rates. In 
light of recent official efforts to stabilize exchange rates, I rather suspect that 
Jacob Frenkel, now the Research  Director  and Economic Counsellor  at the 
IMF,  concluded  that  the tidelands  of  South Carolina would  provide  more 
suitable inspiration for today’s discussion of exchange rate policy. 
Just before lunch, Paul mentioned that he intended to take a walk and have 
a look at some of  the local alligators. He didn’t make clear whether he was 
seeking solace, or  merely planning to get in a little practice for this afternoon’s 
session. In fact, I agree with many of the points that Paul makes in his paper. 
In particular, in the last paper I wrote before joining the Council of Economic 
Advisers (see Mussa 1986), I attempted to document one of the key points that 
Paul discusses-real  exchange rates have been much more volatile under the 
floating exchange rate regime that  has prevailed  since 1973 than under the 
Bretton  Woods  system of  fixed  exchange rates.  As  Paul  emphasizes, this 
increased  volatility  of  real  exchange rates  is  closely  associated  with  the 
increased volatility of nominal exchange rates and with the continued apparent 
sluggishness in the adjustment of national price levels. However, despite “the 
new micro-foundations of Keynesian economics,” I am not as certain as Paul 
that we have a completely  satisfactory  understanding  of the degree of price 
level inertia that appears to be associated  with the large real exchange rate 
movements of the 1980s. 
After  summarizing  the  evidence  that  nominal  exchange  rate  changes 
produce shorter-term but highly persistent changes in real exchange rates, Paul 
states two implications of this phenomenon for exchange rate policy. “First, 
if policymakers know where the equilibrium real exchange rate is headed, they 
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can greatly facilitate adjustment by allowing or inducing nominal rates to move 
in  that  direction. Second, getting  nominal  rates  wrong can be  very  costly 
because it may take a long time for the equilibrium real rates to get themselves 
established.” These statements suggest that Paul supports a quite activist role 
for exchange rate management as a tool  of  economic policy.  However,  the 
analysis in the remaining two-thirds of  Paul’s paper leads him to a far more 
cautious conclusion. “Unfortunately, we still do  not know enough to give clear 
and simple advice in all circumstances  to central bankers and finance ministers. 
In particular, the current situation is one in which an intelligent appreciation 
of what we know about equilibrium exchange rates leads to a definite ‘don’t 
know’ in response to questions about where to go from here.” 
I share the conclusion that Paul reaches at the end of his paper, and I would 
like  to  suggest  some  further  reasons  for  a  cautious  attitude  toward  the 
usefulness of exchange rate management. 
Most importantly,  in my judgement, much  of  the support for an activist 
policy of exchange rate management directed at reducing movements in real 
exchange  rates  is  based  on  misconceptions  concerning  the  causes  and 
consequences of the major swing in the real foreign exchange value of the U.S. 
dollar during the 1980s. Certainly strong real appreciation of the U.S. dollar 
between  the  summer of  1980 and early  1985 created, or contributed  to, a 
number of important economic problems, many of which have not been fully 
corrected by the subsequent depreciation of the dollar. These problems include 
the large and persistent U.S. trade deficit, the difficulties experienced by many 
tradable goods industries in the United States, and the protectionist sentiments 
that these difficulties have helped to engender. However, the existence of these 
important problems  does not  establish that  most  of  the  appreciation  and 
subsequent  depreciation  of  the  U.S.  dollar  during  the  1980s was  either 
avoidable or undesirable, given other events that were occurring in the world 
economy. 
The tightening of U.S. monetary policy from late 1980 through the summer 
of  1982 was surely needed to bring down the U.S. inflation rate and restore 
confidence in the future conduct of  U.S. monetary policy. Real appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar above what many economists believe to be its equilibrium 
path was an essentially inevitable consequence of this monetary policy. Further 
appreciation of  the dollar in  1983 and  1984 probably reflected  (among other 
things) the extremely strong recovery of  the U.S. economy from the recession 
of  1981  -82,  together  with  continued  success in keeping the  inflation rate 
moderate. The appreciation of  the dollar during this period surely helped to 
contain the inflationary pressures that probably would otherwise have accom- 
panied this very rapid economic recovery. Also, the appreciation of the dollar 
and the associated growth of  the U.S. trade deficit helped to spread some of 
the force of the rapid growth of domestic demand in the U.S. economy to other 
countries  where growth of  domestic  demand remained  very  sluggish.  Even 
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the  Federal  Reserve  became  sufficiently  concerned  with  the  threat  of  a 
resurgence  of  inflation,  that  monetary  policy  was tightened  again  between 
April and November of 1984. In view of the enormous costs of bringing down 
inflation in 1981  -82,  it is difficult to criticize the Federal Reserve for seeking 
to  preserve  its  victory  over inflation,  even though the  effect  of  monetary 
tightening in 1984 was almost surely to push the dollar further away from its 
longer-run equilibrium value. 
The downward movement of the dollar from February  1985 through  1987 
can  be  fairly  characterized  as  a  movement  toward  long-run  equilibrium. 
Exchange rate management probably played a useful but subsidiary role in this 
exchange rate adjustment. The Plaza Agreement may have helped to accelerate 
dollar depreciation in the autumn of  1985 and in 1986. However, that process 
was already ongoing for six months before Plaza. The Louvre Accord  and 
subsequent  efforts  at  exchange rate  stabilization  may  have  contributed  to 
greater  stability of  exchange rates since early  1987. However,  in my judge- 
ment,  the tightening  of  U.S.  monetary  policy  because  of  concerns  about 
renewed inflation and the evidence of improvement in the U.S. trade balance 
were probably far more important than exchange rate management in ending, 
and even partially reversing, the process of  dollar depreciation. 
In any event, the key development during the period of dollar depreciation 
since early  1985 is the absence of  a “hard  landing.”  Despite two years of 
precipitous decline in the foreign-exchange value of the dollar, and despite the 
worldwide stock market crash of October 1987, economic expansion continues 
in  the  United  States  and  in  most  other  industrial  countries.  Indeed,  the 
improvement in the U.S. real trade balance since late 1986 (one of the desired 
effects of  dollar depreciation) has clearly helped to keep the U.S. expansion 
going, despite a slower rate of growth of domestic demand in the United States. 
Recently, inflationary pressures may have picked up somewhat in the United 
States, but the U.S. inflation rate remains quite moderate in comparison with 
dire predictions of the consequences of  dollar depreciation, and in spite of a 
relatively low unemployment rate. Of course, because of the recent tightening 
of  monetary  policy,  or for other reasons, the  U.S. economy could  enter a 
recession in  1989 or 1990. However, such a recession  would not be unusual 
given the postwar history of U.S.  business cycles. Thus, all things considered, 
the U.S.  economy and the  world  economy do not  appear to have  suffered 
substantial damage from the correction in the foreign-exchange  value of the 
dollar since early  1985. 
It is certainly possible that an active policy of  exchange rate management 
or, more importantly, a better mix of  monetary  and fiscal policy could have 
avoided some of the appreciation of the dollar between  1980 and early 1985. 
And, surely, cheering the dollar up at the end of its long period of appreciation 
was not a wise endeavor. However, the experience of the  1980s raises grave 
doubts about the feasibility and desirability  of a policy that always seeks to 
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trade or current account balance.  Sometimes it may be necessary or desirable 
to allow the exchange rate to move away from their longer-run  equilibrium 
values,  in  order  to  accommodate  powerful  forces at  work  in  the  world 
economy,  or  in  order  to  provide  latitude  for  economic  policy  to  pursue 
objectives  more  important than  the  rapid  achievement of  current  account 
equilibrium. 
This gencral reason for caution about policies’ exchange rate management 
has considerable  current relevance. Recognizing  that we really don’t know 
how much more, if at all, the dollar needs to depreciate, suppose, for the sake 
of  argument, that we knew that the dollar had to depreciate 25 percent in real 
terms. It  remains  highly  questionable  whether exchange rate  policy  should 
seek  an  immediate  depreciation  of  25 percent,  or indeed  any  immediate 
depreciation. With the U.S. production relatively close to capacity, and with 
some  evidence  of  increased  inflationary  pressures,  monetary  policy  has 
appropriately been tightened.  The effect has probably been to strengthen the 
dollar  in  foreign-exchange  markets. An  effort to  drive the dollar down by 
easing  of  monetary  policy  would  be  a  mistake  so  long  as  the  threat  of 
resurgence  of  inflation  remains serious. An effort to  drive the dollar down 
through other means (except possibly a tightening of fiscal policy) could also 
be counterproductive. It could easily contribute to inflationary pressures that 
would lead to further monetary tightening. Thus, even if longer-run consid- 
erations suggest a substantially lower dollar, it may not be desirable to move 
in that direction immediately. 
Conversely,  suppose that we knew that the dollar was now at its long-run 
equilibrium value. Suppose further that the Federal Reserve has overdone its 
monetary tightening, and the U.S. economy is about to fall into recession (with 
other industrial nations continuing to expand). In a recession, U.S. interest 
rates are likely to fall substantially  unless  this is vigorously  resisted  by  the 
Federal Reserve. Lower U.S. interest rates probably mean sharp declines in the 
dollar. In this recession scenario, it would not make sense to tighten monetary 
policy  in  order to hold  the exchange rate.  Other efforts at  exchange rate 
management might well prove ineffective. Thus, it is not difficult to conceive 
of situations in which the desirable policy is to allow an exchange rate to move 
away from its long-run equilibrium value. 
Another reason for caution in policies of  exchange rate management is that 
we really don’t know what represents a sustainable level of the current account 
balance in the medium term. Paul touches on this point early in his paper, but 
I believe that it deserves more emphasis. Suppose that we have already seen 
most of the favorable effect on the U.S. trade balance of dollar depreciation 
since early  1985. Suppose further that the U.S. will grow at about the same 
rate as other industrial countries and that conventional estimates of income and 
relative price elasticities of exports and imports are correct. If the United States 
needs to achieve a zero current account balance by the middle 1990s, then the 
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further decline in the real foreign exchange value of the dollar. However, if the 
United States and the rest  of the world can live with a U.S. current account 
deficit of  1.5 percent  of U.S. GNP (one-half of  the current level), then  the 
implied magnitude of required dollar depreciation under the standard assump- 
tions is cut in half. A measured current account deficit of 1.5 percent of GNP 
might correspond to an actual deficit of only  1  percent of GNP. With such a 
deficit in the middle  1990s, the ratio of U.S. net external liabilities to U.S. 
GNP would stabilize at around  15 to 20 percent, well below the ratios for a 
number of other industrial countries. Thus, a measured current account deficit 
equal to 1.5  percent of GNP is not a totally unreasonable assumption on which 
to base estimates of  the need for further exchange rate adjustment. 
If  further significant improvement in the U.S. trade balance  is still in the 
pipeline from past dollar depreciation, then little further depreciation may be 
needed to reach a current account deficit equal to 1.5 percent of  U.S. GNP. 
More improvement  still in the pipeline means not only less work to be done 
by  further  depreciation,  it  also  means  that  relative  price  elasticities  are 
probably larger than previous estimates and, hence, more effectiveness from 
each unit of depreciation. Pushing on all of these fronts, takir,g account of the 
many excellent points in Paul’s paper, it is possible to construct a plausible case 
that  no  further real  depreciation  of  the  dollar may  be  needed  to reach a 
sustainable current account position in the medium term. 
This possibility, and the analysis that underlies it, justifies the caution that 
Paul urges in giving advice to policymakers about “where we go from here” 
with respect to the foreign-exchange  value of the dollar. However, I would also 
emphasize  that,  allowing  for  substantial  uncertainty,  the  best  available 
evidence still points to the likely need for some further real dollar depreciation 
in  the  medium  term.  By  making  this  point,  with  suitable  cautions  and 
qualifications, we may help to guard against the danger that a “don’t know” 
response to the question of where the exchange rate needs to move will be used 
to justify a policy of pegging the exchange rate where it is now. For exchange 
rate policy,  I believe that the most important conclusion is Paul Krugman’s 
final conclusion, “in the medium term  . . . exchange rate changes [are] an 
essential part of the adjustment process.” 
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